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Abstract 
Deciding the character and level of official patronage of religion are fundamental questions 
for all states. Yet we know next to nothing about the determinants of such patronage. Are 
democratic governments more or less inclined than autocratic ones to seek legitimacy 
through religious patronage? Is it ultimately ideological struggles that determine the extent 
of government backing of religion? This article addresses these questions through an 
analysis of the evolution of the state’s role as patron and protector of Buddhism (and other 
officially recognised religions) in Thailand. Specifically, it examines changes in 
government expenditure on Thailand’s religious bureaucracy from 1960 to 2016. It finds 
that democratization and ideological struggles have been the main drivers of a significant 
expansion of government spending on religious patronage. 
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The challenges rulers face in managing religion in ways that support their political projects has 
in many polities resulted in the creation of state agencies dedicated to the support and control of 
religious organizations. In 2008, more than 54 percent of countries around the world had such 
religious bureaucracies.1 Yet, there is marked variation, across time and space, both in the 
purposes for and degree to which such agencies, alongside other arms of the state, intervene in 
religious affairs, and with what effects. Some of this variation is reflected in existing studies of 
state-religion arrangements (Sezgin and Künkler, 2014). Quantitative cross-national studies have 
shed important light on the character of state involvement in religion across the world. They have 
found that democracies tend to have a greater degree of separation between religion and state 
than autocracies, and that economically more advanced societies tend to adopt more secularist 
approaches toward religious affairs (Fox, 2006). However, these and similar studies have 
generally, and for understandable reasons, focused on laws and policies that speak to the degree 
of state involvement in religious affairs. Rarely do existing studies pay closer attention to the 
religious state apparatus as such. For example, popular indexes measuring the extent of 
government regulation and favouritism of religion merely record whether states have religious 
affairs ministries or departments (Fox, 2015), or whether states provide various kinds of funding 
for the religious sector (Grim and Finke, 2006). This contribution extends these lines of inquiry 
by leveraging the fact that a government’s desire to control or support religion will manifest not 
only in the presence or absence of religious bureaucracies and different types of religious 
subsidies, but also in shifting levels of government spending. Specifically, it uses process tracing 
to identify the determinants of government expenditure on the religious bureaucracy.  
Where they exist, religious bureaucracies can be more or less well funded, and government 
expenditure on such agencies therefore constitutes a central dimension of the comparative 
politics of religion. Indeed, “the nature of state patronage of religion is a fundamental issue for 
any polity” (Chaves et al, 1994: 1088). There are two advantages of making use of budget data. 
First, whereas existing studies on state-religion relations reduce state funding of religion to 
dichotomous variables (states either provide certain kinds of religious patronage or they don’t), 
this contribution seeks to exploit the fact that government expenditure is a continuous variable. 
Second, budget data allows us to explore the political economy of state intervention in religious 
affairs beyond the brief periods covered by quantitative indexes designed to measure the 
character of government regulation and support of religion.2 That said, budgets for religious 
  
bureaucracies are not a perfect measure of state patronage of religion. Governments may provide 
support to religious organizations through nominally secular parts of the state bureaucracy (as is 
the case in Russia, where the state cooperates closely with Russian Orthodox Church in a variety 
of fields; and in the United Kingdom, where the state funds religious, including Islamic, 
schools), or by raising Church taxes on behalf of officially recognized religious organizations (as 
is the case in Germany). They may also support religion indirectly, by, for instance, making 
charitable donations to religious organizations tax deductible and religious organizations tax 
exempt (as is the case in many countries that do not have religious bureaucracies, such as the 
United States) (see Stepan, 2011). While fully recognizing that religious patronage may take a 
variety of forms, the premise of this article is that in countries with religious bureaucracies, 
budget allocation to the religious bureaucracy is one important indicator of the effort made by 
the state to support and control religious life. However, it is a more reliable indicator of trends in 
state patronage of religion than of absolute levels. 
Why should we care about government expenditure on religion? In many countries, including 
Thailand, the religious bureaucracy accounts for but a minuscule part of the overall government 
budget. Unlike their pre-modern predecessors, contemporary rulers rarely break the bank in their 
efforts to acquire religious legitimacy. However, the political importance of official religious 
patronage tends to exceed its fiscal significance. As one central dimension of religion-state 
relations and as a means of political legitimation, state patronage of religion is likely to impact 
the dynamics of political development, including processes of state formation, nation building, 
and democratization. Furthermore, the very existence of a religious bureaucracy raises obvious 
normative concerns about religious liberties and oppression of religious minorities. However, it 
is certainly possible for states to heavily favour one religion without necessarily regulating 
religious life in a very coercive manner, and Thailand is arguably an example of this (Driessen, 
2014: 233). But state patronage of religion can have serious (unintended) consequences also 
under comparatively benign circumstances. For instance, state support of religion appears to sap 
religious civil society of its vitality (Chaves et al, 1994; Traunmüller and Freitag, 2011). 
McCargo (2012) has noted the deleterious effect of the Thai state’s tight embrace of the Buddhist 
monastic order. He has also highlighted how its efforts to co-opt Islamic leaders by channeling 
significant financial resources in support of Islamic education paved the way for the rise of a 
violent separatist insurgency by alienating the Malay-Muslim grassroots from their traditional 
  
religious authority figures (McCargo 2008). If state patronage of religion matters for things 
political scientists care about, then it is also incumbent on us to get a better understanding of its 
driving forces. 
The article is divided into five main parts. I first review the literature on the comparative 
politics of religion to develop an analytical framework. I then provide a brief introduction to 
Thailand’s religious bureaucracy. Next, I explore evidence on government budget allocation to 
the religious bureaucracy from 1960 to 2016. I then discuss the political and religious context in 
which major shifts in state financing of religion have taken place. I argue that democratization 
and ideological struggles have been key drivers of increased state expenditure on religion. I 
conclude by highlighting opportunities for future research. 
 
Analytical Framework: The Political Economy of Religious Patronage 
 
The political economy of official religious patronage is not well understood. The existing 
literature provides few answers to the question of what drives state patronage of religion. Given 
the limits to our existing knowledge, studies focused on a single country’s experience can make a 
significant contribution to theory development by identifying variables and mechanisms that may 
explain variation in government patronage of religion. Even so, the broader literature on the 
comparative politics of religion can serve as a source of initial ideas about factors possibly 
determining outcomes. I draw on it to generate intuitions about how changes in political 
institutions and ideological struggles might affect states’ religious proclivities. 
While there are many dimensions on which political institutions vary, the scope of this inquiry 
will be limited to one: regime type. The notion that democracies and autocracies have different 
political priorities that are reflected in decisions relating to public expenditure is not a novel one. 
Democracies are, for example, known to spend more on education and healthcare than 
autocracies. While the rational choice approach to understanding the politics of religion has 
highlighted the level of political competition as a key factor in determining the character of state-
religion relations (Gill, 2007), it has been conspicuously silent on the question of how regime 
type might affect incentives for governments to adopt a friendly attitude towards religion. The 
rational choice approach nevertheless provides a useful starting point for thinking through the 
implications of regime change for the political cost/benefit calculations associated with efforts to 
  
gain religious legitimacy. It assumes that political actors above all are interested in securing their 
own political survival, and that decisions by governments to allocate financial resources to 
religion (rather than, say, arms, education, or public health) will be driven by straightforward 
calculations of political opportunity costs. In effect, the degree to which scarce resources are 
devoted to religious patronage will reflect the degree to which religious organizations can make 
or break the careers of political leaders. 
Under what circumstances, then, are religious leaders best positioned to do this? Arguably, 
governments face greater risks that prominent religious actors will be able to tip the political 
scales in situations of intense political competition (Gill, 2007). We can posit that the level of 
political competition is likely to be higher in democracies than in autocracies, given that the 
nominal selectorate (i.e., all people who have a say in choosing government leaders) tends to be 
significantly larger in democracies than in autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). 
Likewise, we may assume that competition will be higher in authoritarian regimes with flawed 
but meaningful elections than in those without (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Indeed, in Malaysia, a 
paragon of precisely such “competitive authoritarianism,” electoral rivalry has been identified as 
a key driver of the runaway growth of that country’s Islamic bureaucracy (Mohamad 2010). We 
thus have good reasons to think that democratization and the introduction of competitive 
elections will unleash dynamics where religious patronage becomes increasingly salient as an 
instrument of political legitimation. Recognizing this possibility, Driessen (2014: 15) recently 
proposed “religiously friendly democratization” as a distinct path of political development, in 
which political elites adopt “very friendly” policies toward religious actors and institutions to 
“generate important sources of stability for a young, fragile democratic regime.”3 
From a methodological perspective, Thailand is a particularly useful case in which to study 
the effects of political institutions, for two reasons. First, because the kingdom has provided 
something of a natural experiment in the form of multiple episodes of democratization and de-
democratization. Second, because regime change in Thailand has not coincided with any 
paradigmatic changes of religion-state relations. In many other countries, the latter condition 
may not hold. In such cases, it may well be that an analysis of changes in the political economy 
of state patronage of religion must place greater weight on more fundamental reconfigurations of 
religion-state relations. Furthermore, the effect of regime change on state patronage of religion is 
likely to be profoundly affected by the degree to which powerful religious organizations are 
  
“institutionally linked (or credibly committed)” to any particular political faction (Gill, 2007: 
54). The impact of regime change may thus be contingent on the nature of the links between 
dominant religious organizations and the previous regime. This is one important background 
condition that shapes the political logic of religious patronage. Regime change may have 
different implications depending on the nature of the historical baseline. Democratic windfalls 
should not be expected where the religious establishment has positioned itself as a staunch 
defender of the ancien régime (Kuru, 2007). Conversely, autocratic windfalls might be expected 
where a dominant religious organization has committed itself to a ruling faction in order to 
jointly re-sacralize a previously highly secularized political order (e.g., the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Vladimir Putin’s Russia). In the case of Thailand, the Sangha is institutionally linked 
and credibly committed to the monarchy and to the state as such, but not to the various political 
factions—military and civilian—that have won and lost power over the past few decades.4 
As this suggests, political institutions are not the only possible determinants of the degree to 
which religious actors can pose a threat to regimes. Variation in state patronage of religion could 
also mirror the rise and fall of factions with distinct ideological perspectives on the position and 
role of religion within the polity. Kuru (2007) has shown how nominally secular states pursue 
different policies towards religion because of such ideological struggles. One might thus expect 
variation in state patronage of religion to reflect shifts in the political fortunes of secularists and 
religious political movements of different stripes. In recent decades, such struggles have 
intensified in many parts of the world, including Asia, as a result of the rise of religious political 
movements, often with close links to political parties, who demand that the secular state allocate 
resources to support and protect the (perceived) religious “core” of national identity (Kinnvall, 
2004). 
Before proceeding, an alternative explanation for changes in the level of state patronage of 
religion needs to be addressed: socio-economic development. In the period under study, the Thai 
economy has been fundamentally transformed, and it is not unreasonable to think that economic 
and social modernization might impact the political economy of state patronage of religion. One 
particularly salient line of argument views economic development—and economic globalization 
in particular—as a factor that, contrary to the predictions of secularization theory (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2011), may be expected to increase demands for state patronage of religion. Kinnvall 
(2004), for example, explains the rise of religious nationalist movements in the 1990s as a social 
  
and political response to the “ontological insecurity” induced by economic globalization. 
However, socio-economic transformations do not impact official religious patronage directly – 
their effects are mediated by political institutions and ideological struggles, along the lines 
discussed above. 
In the following, I will argue that changes in political institutions has had a significant impact 
on state patronage of religion in Thailand. Specifically, democratization has frequently resulted 
in significant windfalls for the religious bureaucracy. Conversely, the advent of military rule has 
frequently been followed by sharp falls in religious spending. This suggests that electoral 
competition provides a strong incentive for political leaders to seek religious legitimacy. I will 
also argue that, although the overarching ideological framework within which all governments in 
the period under study have operated has remained constant, Thai political debates since the 
1990s reflect a growing perception of threat against Buddhism. Thai political elites have 
therefore had to contend with increasing public pressures to “do something” to protect 
Buddhism. One of the things they have done is to boost state patronage of religion by 
significantly increasing the budget for the religious bureaucracy. 
 
Thailand’s Religious Bureaucracy  
 
The religious bureaucracy that we find in Thailand today is a legacy from pre-modern processes 
of state formation. As classic works of Southeast Asian politics have emphasized, the early states 
of the region were conceived of as serving cosmological purposes informed by Hindu and 
Buddhist worldviews, and this was central to their legitimation. In the 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, modernizing monarchs effectively fused the modern Thai state and nation with 
particular conceptions of Buddhism (Jackson, 1989; Keyes, 1989). 
In the period under study here, all government expenditure on the religious bureaucracy had a 
single recipient—the Department of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Education—until 1997. 
That year, the two Buddhist universities that had originally been established by King 
Chulalongkorn—Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (MCU) and Mahamakut Buddhist 
University (MBU)—were transferred from the DRA to the Ministry of University Affairs. In 
October 2002, the bulk of the activities of the DRA were transferred to the National Office of 
Buddhism (NOB). DRA was simultaneously transferred to the Ministry of Culture, where it is 
  
now mainly responsible for overseeing officially recognized minority religions (Islam, 
Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism). Taken together, the NOB and the two Buddhist 
universities today represent the specifically Buddhist state bureaucracy—and together they 
account for the lion’s share of the budget allocated to the religious bureaucracy (see Figure 1).5 
Despite this recent history of bureaucratic reshuffling, the main administrative functions of 
the religious bureaucracy have remained intact. The DRA served as the secretariat for the Sangha 
Supreme Council (SSC); paid monthly stipends to Sangha ecclesiastics with administrative 
duties; managed temple properties; promoted and regulated religious education; sponsored and 
regulated Buddhist missionary activities; and supported the construction and maintenance of 
temples. It also played a key role in planning and arranging royal and royally sponsored Buddhist 
rituals, notably the annual kathin ceremonies that are the hallmark of a righteous Buddhist ruler 
(Gray, 1986). Most of these functions were transferred to the NOB. While much has changed 
since the pre-modern era, the Thai state is still conceived of as serving a soteriological purpose. 
 
Figure 1. Government budget appropriation for the religious bureaucracy, by recipient, fiscal 
years 1960-2016. 
 
 
 
National Office of 
Buddhism
Religious Affairs 
Department
MCU
MBU
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
  
Budgets for Buddhism, 1960-2016 
 
In recent decades, Thai governments have significantly increased their spending on the religious 
bureaucracy. In relative terms, expenditure on Thailand’s religious bureaucracy rose from a 
historic low of 0.08 percent of the national budget for the 1989 fiscal year to a historic high of 
0.32 percent in the budget for the 2008 fiscal year—an increase of 300 percent (see Figure 2).6 
The chart also reveals that exceptionally high levels of growth characterize several distinct 
periods. Particularly striking are the twin spikes in the 1970s, and the rapid increase in the early 
1990s. 
 
Figure 2. Budget appropriation for the religious bureaucracy as share of the national budget, 
fiscal years 1960-2016. 
 
 
Note: Shaded bands indicate budgets passed by democratic governments. Source: Geddes et al 
(2014) for 1960-2010; author’s coding for the remaining years. 
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What, then, might explain these patterns? 
 
The Political Economy of Religious Patronage in Thailand 
 
Political institutions 
 
As a first move to address the question whether changes in political institutions may have 
affected the level of government support for the religious bureaucracy the shaded bands in Figure 
2 indicate budgets passed by democratic governments.7 It is apparent that the advent of 
democratic forms of government in 1975, 1988, and 1992 were followed by exceptional 
increases in the fiscal resources showered on the religious bureaucracy in subsequent budgets. 
However, it is also apparent that the religious bureaucracy reaped windfalls under some 
autocratic governments, as is the case in fiscal years 1971 and 1972 and, to a lesser extent, in 
fiscal year 2007. The first half of the 1990s also stands out as a critical juncture, during which 
expenditure on the religious bureaucracy is ratcheted up, and following which volatility is much 
reduced and the positive co-variation between regime change and religious-patronage effort 
appears to break down. Unlike earlier instances, the autocratic reversals in 2006 and 2014 do not 
bring about sharp falls in the (relative) level of expenditure on the religious bureaucracy. In the 
period under study, the median share of the national budget allocated to the religious 
bureaucracy was 0.26 percent for democratic regimes, and half as much, 0.13 percent, for 
autocratic regimes. Thus, Thai governments have differed greatly in the relative political weight 
put on the religious bureaucracy—and hence on religious legitimation—and at least for some 
periods this variation correlates with changes in political institutions. 
To bring out the regime-related dynamics even more clearly, Table 1 presents the track 
records of Thai prime ministers in terms of their official patronage of religion. It shows the 
average annual rate at which the share of the national budget going to the religious bureaucracy 
grew (or shrank) during their tenure in office. The table also indicates the type of regime the 
different prime ministers represented. Strikingly, three elected prime ministers—Kukrit Pramoj, 
Chatichai Choonhavan, and Chuan Leekpai (I)—stand out as having treated the religious 
bureaucracy most lavishly. In contrast, unelected prime ministers have been by far the least 
charitable. This provides further evidence that regime type has affected the extent to which Thai 
  
governments devote scarce resources towards religious legitimation. Furthermore, it was under 
the first three democratic prime ministers that religious patronage experienced particularly rapid 
increases. Religious patronage therefore appears to be is an especially salient legitimation 
strategy in the early stages of democratization.8 
 
Table 1. Thailand’s prime ministers and the relative budgetary gains of the religious 
bureaucracy, fiscal years 1960 to 2016. 
Prime minister Budget 
years 
Democratic 
regime* 
Change in share of total budget 
allocated to the religious bureaucracy, 
annual average growth rate (%) 
Sarit Thanarat 1960-1963 No 0.51 
Thanom Kittikachon 1964-1974 No 2.62 
Sanya Dharmasakti 1975 No -16.62 
Kukrit Pramoj 1976 Yes 105.29 
Sangad Chaloyu** 1977 No -10.94 
Thanin Kraivichien 1978 No -37.15 
Kriangsak Chamanan 1979-1980 No 4.93 
Prem Tinsulanonda 1981-1988 No -4.23 
Chatichai Choonhavan 1989-1991 Yes 22.65 
Anand Panyarachun 1992 No -15.28 
Chuan Leekpai (I) 1993-1995 Yes 27.15 
Banharn Silpa-archa 1996-1997 Yes 1.01 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 1998 Yes 1.39 
Chuan Leekpai (II) 1999-2001 Yes 0.46 
Thaksin Shinawatra 2002-2006 Yes -0.61 
Surayud Chulanont 2007-2008 No 14.17 
Somchai Wongsawat 2009 Yes -7.79 
Abhisit Vejjajiva 2010-2011 Yes -1.89 
Yingluck Shinawatra 2012-2014 Yes 4.12 
Prayuth Chan-ocha 2015-2016 No 0.15 
Notes: * Source: Geddes et al (2014) for 1960-2010; author’s coding for the remaining years. 
** Sangad Chaloyu was never prime minister; he ruled the country as chairman of a military 
junta. 
 
These are intriguing patterns, which indicate that the advent of democracy is associated with 
increased government spending on the religious bureaucracy. But what are the mechanisms 
producing such increases? The literature on elections in Thailand suggests that the sharp rise in 
effort to gain religious legitimacy under democratic regimes may be driven by the social and 
cultural pressures that politicians face when trying to win voter support. This reflects a moral 
economy of Buddhist merit making, in which the powerful are expected to contribute to the 
  
welfare of the community, not least by making conspicuous donations to Buddhist temples. 
Operating in such a cultural environment, political parties and parliamentarians realised that 
patronage of Buddhism was key to successful electioneering, especially in rural areas where the 
majority of voters are found (see Phillips 1958: 49; Somboon 1977: 17; Arghiros 1993: 187). 
According to former prime minister Chuan Leekpai, Thai parliamentarians face an electoral 
imperative to establish good relationships with monks in their constituency. “When I was 
electioneering (ha siang) I would go to the temple in every village to pay my respects to the 
monks (wai phra). Even if the monks are not allowed to vote, it would be helpful if they spoke 
well of me [to the villagers]. It’s nothing strange. At that point, the monks might ask for budget 
to help repair the chapel (bot), the monks’ cloisters (kuti), etc.”9 Reflecting on the rapid increase 
in budget allocation for the religious bureaucracy under his premiership, Chuan Leekpai 
observed that he made it a priority to raise the government stipend (nitayapat) for ecclesiastical 
monks both times he became prime minister. He explained this, in part, with reference to his 
personal sense of gratitude towards Buddhism; as a young man he had spent several years as a 
temple boy (dek wat). But he also pointed to the pressures for increased government support for 
the monkhood that followed in the wake of broader social changes.10 Given that parliamentarians 
are evaluated by the electorate on basis of their ability to support Buddhism locally, it follows 
that they also have an incentive to use their powers as members of parliament to funnel part of 
the government budget towards religious patronage.11 
Autocratic political leaders may of course also recognize the importance of acting as patrons 
of Buddhism to gain religious legitimacy. Pious Thai autocrats, like the absolute monarchs of the 
past, would, however, have an incentive to concentrate their religious patronage to the 
geographic and symbolic center of the polity—because they can. In comparison with a 
democratic parliament, autocrats do not need broad popular backing and they therefore have less 
to gain by extending their religious patronage to encompass village temples nationwide in any 
more systematic fashion. Autocratic regimes do of course require the backing or at a minimum 
the passive acceptance of communal elites at the national level—which in the Thai case means 
the monarch and the top Sangha hierarchs in Bangkok. Currying their favour has required ritual 
displays of loyalty and submission, in line with royalist conceptions of Thai nationalism, but not 
extravagant spending on the religious bureaucracy. Given the military’s historical role as 
defenders of “nation, religion, king,” Thai military autocrats have tended to regard the legitimacy 
  
of their—royally endorsed—rule with considerable confidence. Unlike parliamentarians, they 
therefore have not been compelled to “buy” the support of the wider monkhood to the same 
extent. 
So far the discussion concerning the relationship between regime type and religious patronage 
has been based on a dichotomous conception of regime type (democracy/autochracy). While 
there are distinct advantages to this approach, it is too crude to be able to reflect all the ways in 
which differences in political institutions have impacted government patronage of religion in 
Thailand. There are important institutional differences also among the non-democratic regimes 
that have ruled Thailand over the past few decades. The most salient contrast is between non-
democratic regimes with an elected legislative assembly and those without. This raises the 
question: Does the introduction of an element of electoral competition within non-democratic 
regimes affect the political economy of religious patronage? There is some evidence to suggest 
that it does. Elections in non-democratic regimes can serve as a spur of official religious 
patronage, but it doesn’t always do so. A comparison of two periods of “semi-democratic” rule 
will illuminate. 
Thailand was an autocracy in the early 1970s and also for most of the 1980s. In both these 
periods Thailand experimented with a hybrid form of regime, in which a non-elected military 
strongman as head of government shared power with an elected legislature.  
It is therefore striking that the brief spike in religious spending under Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikachon (prime minister 1963-73) in the early 1970s coincided with the introduction of an 
elected legislative assembly. In February 1969, parliamentary elections had been held for the 
first time since 1957. This evolution of the military-dominated regime toward a more 
competitive form of authoritarianism had an almost immediate effect on government spending 
directed towards Buddhist temples. The budget for fiscal year 1970 funded restoration and 
development of 930 temples nationwide, representing close to a tripling of the previous year’s 
level (fiscal year 1969: 315 temples) (Religious Affairs Department, 1970: 130-1). Increased 
political competition resulted in intensified politicization of religious patronage, and in efforts by 
parliamentarians to direct the government budget towards projects, such as support for Buddhist 
temples, that would help boost their public image in their constituencies. Newly elected members 
of the House of Representatives managed to wrestle some control of the budget process away 
from the prime minister and the technocrats in the Bureau of the Budget, enabling them to 
  
fashion a budget that reflected the expectations of their constituencies, primarily with regards to 
local economic and social development projects (Neher, 1971: 133; Mezey, 1973: 312), but also 
with regard to the patronage of religion. It was in the context of this parliamentary ascendancy 
that the budget for fiscal year 1971 disproportionately boosted government spending on the 
religious bureaucracy—increasing it by more than 100 percent in absolute terms, and almost as 
much in relative terms, compared to the budget for the previous year. Spending on the religious 
bureaucracy was disproportionally increased also in the budget for fiscal year 1972, albeit less 
dramatically so. Thanom put an end to the parliamentary experiment by staging a coup against 
his own government in November 1971. Parliament was abolished, and political parties banned. 
With full autocratic control restored, Thanom’s last two budgets, for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, 
slashed spending on the religious bureaucracy, in both absolute and relative terms. This surge in 
spending following partial democratization, followed by a decline in the aftermath of autocratic 
reversal, provides a preview of what will happen once budget processes are re-democratized in 
1975, 1988, and 1992. 
The return to semi-democracy in the 1980s did not, however, lead to a similar surge in state 
patronage of religion. With the reintroduction of an electoral element into the governance mix 
under General Prem Tinsulanonda (prime minister 1980-88) one might expect that the political 
dynamic that had led to a rapid increase in spending on the religious bureaucracy under a similar 
semi-democratic arrangement in the early 1970s would have reasserted itself. It did not. Unlike 
Thanom, Prem and his team of economic technocrats retained tight control of all aspects of 
macroeconomic policymaking. Reflecting conditions under Prem in particular, Thailand’s budget 
process was described as so “rigid” that it “effectively prevents elected representatives from 
developing programs or responding to voter demands through public spending” (Christensen et 
al, 1993: 27). 
Thus, under semi-democratic conditions Thai parliamentarians have occasionally been able to 
use the national budget to respond to voters’ religious expectations; under democratic conditions 
they have always been able to do so. The process of democratization therefore stands out as an 
important driver of official state patronage of religion in Thailand. It is, however, also clear that 
the impact of regime change declines over time. The patterns observed in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s have not been repeated since the turn of the century. 
 
  
Ideological Struggles 
 
Next we must ask whether it is possible that the patterns of religious patronage reflect the 
outcome of ideological struggles over the role of religion rather than changes in political 
institutions. The answer is not straightforward. The dramatic fluctuations that were observed in 
the 1970s and late 1980s cannot be explained by ideological factors. They are primarily the result 
of changes in political institutions. However, the ratcheting up of religious spending in the 1990s 
and the stabilization of such spending at a higher level does, at least in part, reflect intensified 
ideological struggles. 
Historical experiences shape the ideological orientation of political actors, and, as a 
consequence, the character of religion-state relations under different types of political regimes. 
Where religious organizations have been intertwined with autocratic regimes, for instance, 
regime change often results in a secularist backlash against religion. Perhaps Thailand’s military 
autocrats (like their colleagues in Turkey) have just been more secular in orientation than elected 
leaders who better reflect popular devotion to Buddhism? This seems implausible. Since the late 
1950s, autocratic Thai governments have been committed to a hegemonic conception of 
“Thainess” in which Buddhism is one of the three pillars of national identity. The booms and 
busts of religious patronage in the 1970s and 1980s therefore cannot be said to reflect the 
vicissitudes of ideological struggles. 
It is however possible that ideational and institutional factors interact in ways that reinforce 
the feast-and-famine pattern experienced by the religious bureaucracy in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Government patronage of religion arguably carries different symbolic connotations under 
conditions of personalized authoritarian rule than under conditions of decentralized and 
fragmented electoral competition. Through grandiose acts of religious patronage, authoritarian 
strongmen risk giving rise to the impression that they are entering into symbolic competition 
with Buddhism’s primary patron and protector, according to royalist conceptions of Thai 
nationalism: the monarch. In fact, Phibun Songkhram’s extravagant patronage of Buddhism in 
the 1950s was understood in terms of competition with the king (Thak, 2007: 66). Under 
democratic governments that risk is much reduced, as any credit for official religious patronage 
is diffused among all members of the governing coalition. 
  
What then of developments since the mid 1990s, after which it becomes much less clear 
whether changes in political institutions have much of an effect on levels of religious patronage? 
Recall in particular that the fall of democracy in 2006 and 2014 did not have the kind of serious 
negative effects on state patronage of Buddhism that typically accompanied autocratic reversals 
in the 1970s and (to a lesser extent) in 1992. Is it possible that ideological struggles have 
trumped political institutions? 
There is some evidence to support such an argument. Ideological struggles over the position 
of Buddhism within the Thai polity have intensified since the late 1980s. But it has not been a 
conflict pitting religious nationalists versus secularists. Rather, different stripes of religious 
nationalists have been in broad agreement that Thai Buddhism is in “crisis” (Kusa, 2007). The 
sense of alarm was in part grounded in a perceived threat from new religious movements, such as 
Santi Asoke and Wat Phra Dhammakaya. It was in part caused by frank and irreverent mass 
media reports, made possible thanks to democratization, that exposed a long series of 
misbehaving monks (Gabaude, 1996: 247-253). Thus, Kukrit, the former prime minister, in 1990 
penned a pamphlet entitled Crisis in Buddhism, where he highlighted how institutional 
Buddhism was failing to adapt to changing social and political conditions (Kusa, 2007: 43).  
While there is disagreement about the precise nature of that crisis, and over appropriate 
institutional arrangements to address it, few have challenged the notion that the state has a 
central role to play in the provision of patronage and protection of religion. High levels of 
government spending on the religious bureaucracy has therefore enjoyed continuing appeal 
across political and sectarian divides. 
Conservative groups perceived the new religious movements as “a distinct threat to Thai 
Buddhism and to the regulated and ordered symbols of civil power and authority” (Taylor, 1993: 
79). This perception gave rise to demands for a strengthening of the religious bureaucracy. 
Indeed, it was claimed that underfunding of the RAD “had partly been responsible for the 
proliferation of illegal sects [such as Santi Asoke]” (Bangkok Post, 1989). Conservative Buddhist 
groups also argued that Santi Asoke’s advances ought to be countered by making Buddhism the 
official national religion (Taylor, 1993: 74). At the same time, others perceived the “corruption” 
of the Sangha as the more fundamental threat to the integrity of the religious pillar of national 
identity. The political ascendancy in the early 1990s of Santi Asoke’s most prominent lay 
supporter and the leader of the Palang Dhamma Party (PDP), Chamlong Srimuang, thus led to an 
  
intensification of official efforts to “strengthen” Buddhism. Much like the orthodox monks who 
had expelled Santi Asoke from the Sangha (from which it had declared independence), 
Chamlong viewed Buddhist morality as the solution par excellence to all of Thailand’s political, 
economic, and social problems (McCargo, 1997). In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that 
state expenditure on religion should have grown so dramatically from 1992 to 1995, when the 
PDP was the second-largest party in parliament and part of the governing coalition headed by 
Chuan Leekpai. Despite the ideological and sectarian rifts between conservatives and 
progressives that had opened in Thai politics, there was broad consensus that the state needed to 
do more to ensure the flourishing of Buddhism. 
It is telling that democratic governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s not only increased 
spending on the religious bureaucracy, they also shifted spending towards areas that suggest that 
they were responding to concerns about a crisis in institutional Buddhism and in public morality 
(Gabaude, 1996). Thus, the Chatichai government made massive investments to reform and 
strengthen the Sangha’s administration, and to support religious education. The Chuan 
government, in turn, prioritized efforts to subject citizens to “moral education,” to support 
religious education, and to strengthen the administrative capacity of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. 
To boost its institutional capacity to enforce proper behaviour of monks, the Sangha in 1993 
established a monastic police force tasked with disciplining its own members (Kusa, 2007: 
chapter 5). DAR funded the resultant Police Monks’ Operations Center. Thus, while temple-
centred pork-barrel politics remained an important dimension of government patronage of 
religion under the democratic governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s, resources were 
also shifted towards institution building. 
The administrative and educational reforms prescribed by the 1997 constitution further 
heightened anxieties about the position of Buddhism within the Thai polity (Suwanna, 2003; 
Kusa, 2007; Katewadee, 2013). Indeed, in 2001, the SSC drafted and pushed for the enactment 
of a new Sangha Act, intended to secure Buddhism’s “special” position within the Thai polity. 
After the SSC failed to get the draft through parliament, leading Sangha hierarchs backed the 
creation of a civil-society-styled Sangha proxy, named the Buddhism Protection Center of 
Thailand (BPCT), which was designed to advance the Sangha’s political agenda in the public 
sphere. In September 2002, the BPCT rose to political prominence when it organized a concerted 
propaganda effort and led mass monastic protests. As a consequence, the government headed by 
  
Thaksin Shinawatra was forced to establish the ONB to ensure that the state bureaucracy would 
manage Buddhist affairs separately from those of other religions, thus signalling Buddhism’s 
“special” position within the Thai polity (Kusa, 2007: chapter 3). In subsequent years the BPCT 
and other conservative civil society groups, often centred around the public Buddhist 
universities, have mobilised to secure firmer political commitments to state Buddhism, not least 
in hitherto unsuccessful attempts to make Buddhism official state religion in conjunction with 
the drafting of the constitutions enacted in 1997, 2007, and 2017. They have also pushed, so far 
unsuccessfully, for the enactment of a law for the patronage and protection of Buddhism. It 
would, if enacted in its draft form, establish a special government-run fund to shower even more 
money in support of official Thai Buddhism (Larsson, 2016: 24-25). 
Since 2005, the Thai political system has experienced an unprecedented crisis of political 
legitimacy. The conflict between so called Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts (i.e., opponents and 
supporters, respectively, of Thaksin Shinawatra and his affiliates) has resulted in a cycle of mass 
protests, violence, coups (military and judicial), and elections. In this climate of increasing 
polarization, religious passions have been stoked. While the conflict cannot be reduced to 
religious factors, or neatly be mapped onto religious or sectarian identities, it has nevertheless 
become apparent that Buddhist groups have aligned themselves with ideological partisans. Thus, 
Santi Asoke and prominent representatives of the forest monk tradition abandoned Thaksin, 
whom they had originally supported, and joined the counter-majoritarian Yellow Shirts. The 
majoritarian Red Shirts, in contrast, found support within important parts of the Sangha 
hierarchy and from the BPCT. There was also a perception that Thaksin, after alienating his 
original religious backers, had formed a new alliance with Wat Phra Dhammakaya (see 
Katewadee, 2013).  
The fact that government spending on the religious bureaucracy since 2005 has reached 
unprecedented levels must be understood in relation to continuing alarm over the state of Thai 
Buddhism and ideological mobilization of rival groups in “defence” of Buddhism. It is no 
surprise, in this transformed ideological context, that autocratic governments have found it 
expedient to maintain high levels of state patronage of religion after they have seized power from 
democratic governments. In some ways religion is today a more important factor of political 
legitimation than ever before, and this is reflected in budgets for the religious bureaucracy. 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
This account of the political economy of religious patronage in Thailand provides evidence that 
political institutions and ideological struggles affect government spending on religious 
patronage. In Thailand, democratic governments have tended to allocate more funds towards 
religious purposes than their autocratic counterparts, and electoral competition stands out as one 
of the main drivers of religious patronage. This is mainly due to the fact that electoral 
competition creates incentives for politicians to meet not only the material but also the religious 
expectations of voters. This explains, at least in part, the dramatic increases in government 
spending on religious affairs that tend to ensue when parliamentarians take control of public 
spending decisions from autocratic governments (and their technocratic allies). While autocratic 
leaders are also expected to act as patrons of Buddhism, the pressures they face have generally 
been more limited, and they have therefore often been inclined to cut back on the budget for 
religious patronage after it has been ratchetted up by popularly elected predecessors. 
Since the 1990s, however, it has become increasingly clear that the character and level of 
government patronage of religion reflects, in part, ideological struggles over the relationship 
between religion and state. The waning significance of political institutions as a determinant of 
religious patronage has become manifest in the wake of the 2006 and 2014 military coups. The 
sustained high levels of spending on the religious bureaucracy under democratic and autocratic 
governments alike reflect religious political mobilization that no government can easily ignore. 
Amidst heightened pereptions of a variety of increasingly potent “threats” to Buddhism, religious 
actors have successfully adopted street-based politics to compel governments to demonstrate 
greater commitment to the patronage and protection of what they perceive to be correct forms of 
the dominant religion. Governments have pandered to such sentiments through increasingly 
generous backing of Buddhism. 
The effects of democratization and ideological struggles on state patronage of religion might 
fruitfully be explored also in other countries. Within Southeast Asia, the political drivers of state 
patronage of religion can be explored in Indonesia and Burma/Myanmar, which have both 
undergone significant political transitions in recent years. More ambitiously, the creation of 
datasets on budget allocations to religious bureaucracies by governments across the world would 
  
allow political scientists to shed new light on broader regional or global trends and patterns in 
official religious patronage. 
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Notes 
1 Data from 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Analysis/RAS2012/RAS2012_Var1966_1.asp. Accessed 
11 December 2015. 
2 The Religion and State Dataset, for instance, covers the period from 1990 to 2008. The indexes 
developed by Grim and Finke (2006) now cover the period from 2003 to 2008. 
3 Democracy can be conceptualized in a variety of manners. Here a minimalist (i.e., electoral) 
conception is adopted. This is in accordance with the theoretical argument, with its focus on the 
scope of political competition. 
4 I use Sangha (upper case) to refer to the ecclesiastic hierarchy, and sangha (lower case) to refer 
to the wider monkhood. 
5 Discussion of government budget data (here and subsequently) is based on author’s 
calculations using information on government budgets as published in Bureau of the Budget, 
Ngoppraman Doi Sangkhep [Thailand’s Budget in Brief] (Bangkok: Prime Minister's Office) or 
in Ratchakitchanubeksa, available online at http://www.mratchakitcha.soc.go.th. 
6 The data used here referes to budget appropriations. Government spending and expenditure are 
used interchangeably to refer to budget appropriations. The Thai fiscal year runs from October 1 
  
to September 30. The budget is generally passed into law several months prior to the start of the 
fiscal year. To avoid confusion between calendar and fiscal years, all yearly references are for 
the calendar year unless it is indicated that they are for the fiscal year. 
7 The distinction between autocracy and democracy hinges on whether the executive came to 
power through fair and competitive elections. Given the theoretical concern with political 
competition it will be useful also to make a distinction between two different types of autocratic 
regimes: those without and those with popularly elected legislatures. 
8 The data for the different prime ministers only refers to the budgets they were responsible for 
passing. Prime ministers often administer the budgets of their predecessors when they first take 
office. While the period from 1973 to 1976 is often referred to as a democratic interlude, only 
one budget was passed by a fully democratic government in this three-year period: that of Kukrit 
Pramoj. 
9 Interview with Chuan Leekpai, Bangkok, 19 September 2017. 
10 Many of these issues are discussed in the next section. 
11 It should be noted that religious orientation is not a salient part of the cleavage structures 
defining the Thai party system. 
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